<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"><channel><title>Threat Unpacked</title><description>Operational malware analysis — deep dives into incidents, implants, and intrusion sets.</description><link>https://threatunpacked.com/</link><item><title>In-Band Root: The Ivanti Zero-Day Chain and the Operators Who Automated Themselves</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/11/05/ivanti-inband-root-agentic-operators/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/11/05/ivanti-inband-root-agentic-operators/</guid><description>One 36 KB Python file with zero detections led to a staged exploit framework, a second independent operator, an Apache module nobody has seen before, and the clearest public evidence yet of intrusion campaigns run by AI coding agents</description><pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 14:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>1,413 CVEs and a Working Tuesday: How to Triage the Biggest Patch Release Microsoft Ever Shipped</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/28/patch-tuesday-october-2026-triage/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/28/patch-tuesday-october-2026-triage/</guid><description>October 2026 Patch Tuesday broke the counter: the first four-digit release, more CVEs than any full year before 2024, three zero-days, and 59 wormable-class bugs. A triage guide for defenders who cannot patch four digits in a week: which of the three zero-days matters, why the CVSS 10.0 does not, the zero-click Outlook and preview-pane set, the wormable server tail, and the two releases that will lag in every locked-down fleet.</description><pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 23:30:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Cloudflare, Wiz, ELB, and Still No Hostname: Auditing Domain Coverage Across the Fleet</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/28/domain-coverage-census/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/28/domain-coverage-census/</guid><description>An IR audit of hundreds of company domains sorted into a four-quadrant coverage matrix: Cloudflare versus Falcon, cloud origins versus our own environment. The dead trail through four log sources, what the Cloudflare API does and does not solve, how red teams find the same gaps from outside, and the audit pipeline that turns the manual grind into a weekly diff with a dark-quadrant alert.</description><pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 22:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>The Patch You Cannot See in the Logs: A Lab Autopsy of php2shell</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/28/php2shell-lab-autopsy/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/28/php2shell-lab-autopsy/</guid><description>Three days in a lab with CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619: what the upload-progress bug actually does to a PHP server, the six exploit flavors it enables, the four walls exploit developers hit on the way to RCE, an independent failure to reproduce the loudest public chain, and a one-request worker deadlock that the patched and unpatched servers log identically.</description><pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 20:30:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Patching the Log: A clfs.sys Patch Diff, Thirty CVEs of History, and the October Trio (CVE-2026-70233 / -85870 / -85355)</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/19/clfs-patch-diff-october-trio/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/19/clfs-patch-diff-october-trio/</guid><description>Full teardown of the Windows Common Log File System driver and its October 2026 Patch Tuesday bugs: how a kernel parser that honors pointer placeholders and attacker-controlled offsets from a user-writable file became Windows&apos; most consistently farmed privilege-escalation surface (six exploited-in-the-wild bugs 2022-2025, Nokoyawa and Storm-2460 chains reconstructed), a verified static patch diff of clfs.sys 10.0.26100.9278 against 10.0.26100.9711 (obtained via symbol-server hashes, ~1 KB of new validation code, PSFX extraction post-mortem included), the three new CVEs with their full MSRC specifics including the mysterious CWE-829, Talos&apos;s file-signature Snort rules, and why the CLFS authentication mitigation may finally be closing the frontier.</description><pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 14:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>The MotW Endgame: Four Years of Mark-of-the-Web Bypasses and the Zero-Day That Moved Inside the Shell (CVE-2026-96951)</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/19/motw-endgame-cve-2026-96951/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/19/motw-endgame-cve-2026-96951/</guid><description>Deep dive into CVE-2026-96951, the actively exploited Windows Shell command injection from the record 1,413-CVE October 2026 Patch Tuesday: the full Mark-of-the-Web anatomy (Zone.Identifier ADS, IAttachmentExecute zone semantics, SmartScreen/Protected View/App Guard consumers), the four-year bypass lineage from Magniber&apos;s containers to 7-Zip&apos;s RAR5 stream trick to APT28&apos;s zero-click Shell bugs, why the exploit economics always pointed here, the notable fact that one of the finders is a Google TAG researcher credited as using Claude with Anthropic, and the controls that still work when the marker is gone.</description><pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>The Biography of a Bulletproof Box: Nine Months with the NetScaler Copycat&apos;s Server</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/04/bulletproof-box-biography/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/04/bulletproof-box-biography/</guid><description>Third piece in the pitboss series: the second wave&apos;s collector at 213.209.159.55 is still live, still serving per-target droppers, and its code evolved from gen-3 to v19-plus while I watched. Full teardown of the forced HA-failover logic and the three-channel C2 (one-shot relay, 15-second pull tasking with output return, HTTP front), why the exfil side is write-only and what that means for victims, the nine-month attack history of the address (January port scans, February .env probes, March .git probes via Go-http-client, Ligolo-ng tunnels in October), a correction to my own domain-aging claim, and the detection set that matters now.</description><pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 10:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Twenty in Eighteen Hours: Tracking the NetScaler Second Wave Through Its Own Constants</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/03/netscaler-second-wave-constant-pivot/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/03/netscaler-second-wave-constant-pivot/</guid><description>A follow-up investigation to the pitboss teardown: pivoting the public malware corpus on the passwords, tokens, and placeholder strings extracted from the campaign samples turns two copycat bundles into a twenty-deployment operation with three code generations, surfaces chisel on the exfil host, doubles the Platypus enrollment count, and recovers a victim&apos;s implant config that phoned a lab address that does not exist. With the pivot methodology, its traps (the MD5 test vector that fakes attribution), and expanded IOCs.</description><pubDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 23:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Pitboss Never Sleeps: Reverse Engineering the NetScaler Log-to-Root Chain (CVE-2026-88771 / CVE-2026-88772)</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/03/netscaler-pitboss-log-to-root/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/10/03/netscaler-pitboss-log-to-root/</guid><description>Full teardown of the September 2026 NetScaler ADC/Gateway zero-day campaign: the ns_monuploadd_err.pl log-poisoning root cause analyzed line by line from firmware, the watchTowr DTLS heap-overflow PoC dissected down to its setcontext/ROP chain, and the complete payload landscape grounded in first-hand analysis of 18 in-the-wild campaign samples: the dual-mode webshell installers, update_c08937.pl with its plaintext passwords, the nsmon.pl cron bind shell no vendor named, Platypus enrollment certificates that date the C2 infrastructure to September 2, and a post-disclosure WHIPSHOT/SLAPSHOT copycat kit. With detection and eradication guidance.</description><pubDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 18:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>DragonForce: Deep Reverse Engineering of the Ransomware Behind M&amp;S and Co-op UK</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/07/dragonforce-ransomware-deep-re/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/07/dragonforce-ransomware-deep-re/</guid><description>Full technical analysis of DragonForce&apos;s Windows x86 encryptor: MinGW C++ with Salsa20 multi-mode encryption, BYOVD kernel driver EDR bypass (rentdrv2.sys + truesight.sys), WMI shadow copy deletion, Restart Manager file handle killing, IOCP network scanning, and COM-based scheduled task persistence.</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>RansomHub: Deep Reverse Engineering of the #1 Active RaaS</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/06/ransomhub-go-ransomware-deep-re/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/06/ransomhub-go-ransomware-deep-re/</guid><description>Full technical analysis of RansomHub&apos;s Go-based Windows encryptor: garble package obfuscation, X25519+ChaCha20 encryption scheme, built-in SMB lateral movement using go-smb, IOCP parallel file encryption, and service recovery disruption.</description><pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>SafePay Ransomware: Deep Reverse Engineering of a LockBit 3.0 Fork</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/05/safepay-ransomware-lockbit-fork-deep-re/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/05/safepay-ransomware-lockbit-fork-deep-re/</guid><description>Assembly-level analysis of SafePay ransomware — a LockBit 3.0 derivative with a custom CRC-32 import resolver, triple-XOR string obfuscation, IOCP-driven parallel encryption, and NT-layer privilege escalation. Full API inventory recovered by cracking 130+ export hashes.</description><pubDate>Sun, 05 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>WealthGAF and ASYNCBOTNET: A Fake Forex CRM Brand Built to Deliver a Four-Stage Python RAT</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/04/wealthgaf-asyncbotnet-forex-rat/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/04/wealthgaf-asyncbotnet-forex-rat/</guid><description>A 2,253-byte ZIP posing as API documentation for a fake forex CRM delivers a four-stage chain: LNK trojan with conhost --headless hiding, a compiled AutoIt downloader, a PNG/ZIP polyglot Python bundle, and a previously undocumented Socket.IO RAT named ASYNCBOTNET that monitors 14 crypto wallets and 12 exchanges. A single TLS certificate ties WealthGAF to a 13-brand fake forex platform cluster, all sharing the same Kubernetes C2 origin.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 18:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Ph-Tagged, Tunnel-Hopping, and APC-Injecting: Inside the SERPENTINE#CLOUD Dropper Chain</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/04/serpentine-cloud-cloudflare-tunnel-asyncrat/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/04/serpentine-cloud-cloudflare-tunnel-asyncrat/</guid><description>A WsgiDAV opendir tip from @smica83 leads to a live SERPENTINE#CLOUD staging server on a Cloudflare Tunnel. Three BAT files, two delivery paths, four Python runtimes, an Early Bird APC DLL, and a naming convention that traces the campaign back to December 2022.</description><pubDate>Sat, 04 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Root in Eight Weeks: Reconstructing a Chinese Operator&apos;s Kill Chain Through Brazil&apos;s Federal District Government Network</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/02/semob-gdf-kill-chain/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/02/semob-gdf-kill-chain/</guid><description>File timestamps preserved inside a 9.1GB archive found on a Chinese threat actor&apos;s staging server let us reconstruct a complete intrusion: WordPress web shell to DirtyPipe container escape, socat tunnelling, fscan credential spray across 164 government machines, and 754MB of internal GitLab source code — all in eight weeks.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 22:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Ice Scorpion on Alibaba: A Chinese Operator&apos;s Singapore Staging Server, 164 Compromised Brazilian Government Machines, and a 933MB Fake GPU Driver</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/02/behinder-alibaba-brazil-staging/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/02/behinder-alibaba-brazil-staging/</guid><description>A Shodan hit on an Alibaba Cloud Singapore IP leads to a 9.1GB archive that turns out to be an attacker&apos;s working directory from inside a compromised Brazilian government server — containing a DirtyPipe exploit, fscan lateral movement results across the GDF internal network, 164 confirmed credential compromises, and 754MB of exfiltrated GitLab source code.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 20:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>MegaDumper: One Staging Server, Five Years, Zero Detections</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/02/megadumper-trumvps-five-year-staging-server/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/02/megadumper-trumvps-five-year-staging-server/</guid><description>A Shodan scan for Singapore open directories surfaces a TRUMVPS server that has been quietly hosting the same .NET credential stealer — under the same filename — since 2021. The current build has zero detections.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 18:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>NAKAZ MO: Property Declaration Lure Targeting Ukrainian Ministry of Defence Personnel</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/02/nakaz-mo-ukraine-lnk-ps1-downloader/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/02/nakaz-mo-ukraine-lnk-ps1-downloader/</guid><description>A ZIP archive impersonating wartime asset disclosure paperwork delivers a two-stage LNK→PowerShell downloader to Ukrainian targets — with a geo-fenced C2 that returns 403 to every sandbox that tries to fetch the payload.</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 14:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>In the Wild: Indonesia&apos;s Cyber Underground Comes for Your Cloud</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/02/sea-underground-2026-govti-v4-tempix-botnet/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/02/sea-underground-2026-govti-v4-tempix-botnet/</guid><description>How a mass Next.js exploitation campaign named after the President is quietly backdooring AWS Singapore, DigitalOcean, and anything else it can reach</description><pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>CHM Lure, Nuitka Python Backdoor, CDN Fronting: APT Targets Pakistan Military</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/01/chm-nuitka-python-pakistan-military-apt/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/01/chm-nuitka-python-pakistan-military-apt/</guid><description>A CHM file themed around restricted Pakistani defense exhibitions drops a Nuitka-compiled Python backdoor named after the country&apos;s annual military budget document. The C2 routes through a G-Core CDN edge node shared with Microsoft Windows Update traffic — designed to disappear into network telemetry.</description><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 14:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>FUD .url, WebDAV Delivery, and a NetSupport RAT Phoning Home on Telegram</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/01/fud-url-webdav-netsupport-rat/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/01/fud-url-webdav-netsupport-rat/</guid><description>A Windows URL shortcut disguised as a PDF had 1/75 detections at submission time. It used the WebDAV-over-HTTP UNC trick to silently execute an EXE off a Hong Kong opendir. Two stages later: a silent NetSupport Manager install beaconing to a 16-day-old C2 domain while Telegram told the operator their new victim was live.</description><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Silverfox Dropper Campaign: Three Lures, One C2, Gambling Infrastructure</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/01/silverfox-rar-z-extension-industrial-lure/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/07/01/silverfox-rar-z-extension-industrial-lure/</guid><description>A RAR renamed .z to bypass filters drops a Silverfox InnoSetup installer with a spreader payload. Three lures in one campaign: industrial safety training, a Chinese company seal, and an HR recruitment form. The C2 IP hosted Chinese gambling sites from late 2023 into early 2024.</description><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>One Tweet, Sixteen Servers: Pivoting the Chopi RAT Vishing Operation</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/06/30/chopi-rat-vishing-opendir-pivot/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/06/30/chopi-rat-vishing-opendir-pivot/</guid><description>A WsgiDAV opendir gave me staging payloads and a leaked debug log. AES config RE confirmed all six C2 IPs and the full encrypted capability set. PE build timestamp forensics revealed two back-to-back build sessions; the operator&apos;s dropper cluster leaked their build-system path on VirusTotal. Neo4j graph of 70 nodes across 3 cloud providers. YARA rules included.</description><pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>It Only Decrypts on the Victim: DPAPI Host-Locking in a ShadowPad .dat</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/06/30/paper-dat-dpapi-host-locked-shadowpad/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/06/30/paper-dat-dpapi-host-locked-shadowpad/</guid><description>VirusTotal called it PlugX. It broke down into an RC4 layer I could crack offline, a ScatterBrain-flavoured shellcode stub, and then a wall: the real implant is sealed with machine-scoped DPAPI, so it only decrypts on the one victim it was built for. Here&apos;s everything up to that wall, why the wall is the whole point, and why I think this is closer to ShadowPad than PlugX.</description><pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Unpacking Canon.dat: PlugX, a Config Extractor, and the C2 Infrastructure Behind It</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/06/27/unpacking-canon-dat-plugx-c2-infrastructure/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/06/27/unpacking-canon-dat-plugx-c2-infrastructure/</guid><description>A single XOR&apos;d Canon.dat turned into a campaign map: reversing the CanonStager loader, writing a memory-based config extractor, pulling the related samples, and walking nine builds out to their CloudFlare-fronted C2 origins.</description><pubDate>Sat, 27 Jun 2026 12:00:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Building a Scalable Windows Driver Vulnerability Analyzer (Part 3): From One Driver to 1,775</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/03/12/building-a-scalable-windows-driver-vulnerability-analyzer-part-3-from-one-driver-to-1775/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/03/12/building-a-scalable-windows-driver-vulnerability-analyzer-part-3-from-one-driver-to-1775/</guid><description>In Part 1, I built a pipeline to ingest and classify tens of gigabytes of Windows drivers. In Part 2, I ran it at scale and found the initial results underwhelming. IOCTLance found bugs, but understanding what those bugs meant required more context than symbolic execution alone c</description><pubDate>Thu, 12 Mar 2026 05:13:44 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Building a Scalable Windows Driver Vulnerability Analyzer (Part 2)</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/02/04/building-a-scalable-windows-driver-vulnerability-analyzer-part-2/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/02/04/building-a-scalable-windows-driver-vulnerability-analyzer-part-2/</guid><description>In [Part 1], I built a pipeline to churn through gigabytes of drivers. I started with a massive raw dataset of 58.5 GB of drivers. However, feeding this volume into a static analyzer is inefficient. I aggressively filtered the set: This left me with a curated dataset of 28,000 un</description><pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2026 04:13:27 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Building a Scalable Windows Driver Vulnerability Analyzer (Part 1)</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/01/21/building-a-scalable-windows-driver-vulnerability-analyzer-part-1/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/01/21/building-a-scalable-windows-driver-vulnerability-analyzer-part-1/</guid><description>Background As I spent more time looking at kernel drivers, that interest gradually grew. Finding my first CVE in a Windows driver pushed me to pay closer attention to this area. Around the same time, I started reading more practical write-ups on driver work, including a post by e</description><pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2026 01:03:59 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Why This Blog Exists</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2026/01/07/why-this-blog-exists/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2026/01/07/why-this-blog-exists/</guid><description>Most malware analysis content focuses on what a sample does. This blog focuses on why it matters during an incident. Through case studies, technical deep dives, and operational reflections, I write about: Clarity matters, assumptions are dangerous, and systems fail in ways their </description><pubDate>Wed, 07 Jan 2026 22:31:00 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Reversing a Microsoft-Signed Rootkit: The Netfilter Driver</title><link>https://threatunpacked.com/2025/10/07/reversing-a-microsoft-signed-rootkit-the-netfilter-driver/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://threatunpacked.com/2025/10/07/reversing-a-microsoft-signed-rootkit-the-netfilter-driver/</guid><description>A detailed technical analysis of Netfilter.sys, a malicious kernel driver that was legitimately signed by Microsoft through attestation signing. This post explores how the rootkit harnesses the Windows Filtering Platform for stealthy IP redirection, the C2 communication mechanism</description><pubDate>Tue, 07 Oct 2025 08:14:24 GMT</pubDate></item></channel></rss>